XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Two Accounts of Kantian Autonomy

Ernesto V Garcia

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Fermi
Data: 26 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010


In this paper, I argue that Kant scholarship widely overlooks the fact that Kant presents two very different conceptions of autonomy: (1) a 'despotic' model of autonomy according to which reason subjugates or coercively subordinates our empirical self, as typically found in Kant's earlier writings like the 1785 Groundwork; and (2) a more attractive 'consent-based' model of autonomy as found in his later writings, where this is interestingly linked with his newly-formulated Wille-Willkuer distinction, his defense of the possibility of free immoral actions, and his recognition of what Rawls calls a more Augustinian account of our human nature.