XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Intuition and Judgment: How Not to Think about the SIngularity of Intuition (and the Generality of Concepts) in Kant

Thomas Land

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Rousseau
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 09 aprile 2010


I argue that a wide-spread view, according to which a Kantian intuition is the analogue of a singular term, is false as an interpretation of Kant. Its apparent plausibility rests on attributing to Kant a Fregean view of judgment. I show that Kant does not hold a Fregean view of judgment and argue that, therefore, intuition cannot be understood on analogy with the notion of a singular term.