XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant on the Apriority and Discursivity of Philosophy

Albert Houston Smit

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Pacinotti
Data: 26 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

Kant claims that, although philosophical and mathematical cognition are both synthetic a priori, the former, unlike the latter, is cognition “from concepts.” This seems inconsistent with Kant’s insistence that all synthetic cognition requires intuition. Indeed, transcendental philosophy needs to appeal to empirical, as well as a priori, intuition. And this seems inconsistent with Kant’s insistence that philosophy is a priori. I argue that these inconsistencies are merely apparent. In contrasting it with mathematical cognition, Kant is claiming only that philosophical cognition is through concepts unaccompanied by any intuition. This cognition is a priori, because it is had in insight. It is synthetic, because this insight appeals to possible intuitions merely as they are represented in concepts.