XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant’s Other Arguments For Practical Freedom

Oliver Sensen

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Rousseau
Data: 23 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 12 aprile 2010


In the Groundwork Kant famously states that freedom (and the moral law that comes with it) would have to be given up if it contradicts the causal determinism of empirical nature. But what if one cannot form the conception of a determined world without one’s sense of freedom? In this paper I argue that Kant’s texts contain such an argument. If successful, the argument can show that even if one believes in a causally determined nature, one cannot and should not give up one’s sense of freedom. While the argument merely strengthens one’s psychological sense of being free, it is nonetheless an attractive defense. It does not rely on a controversial conception of a noumenal world. It also considerably supports one’s sense of freedom, and so for practical purposes strengthens the moral law that goes hand in hand with freedom, according to the Groundwork.