XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Transcendental Idealism, Intuitions and the Contents of Perceptual Experience:

Anna Urszula Tomaszewska

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Rousseau
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 09 aprile 2010


The paper raises some criticisms of McDowell’s conceptualist reading of Kant’s theory of experience. I argue that the theory bears more affinities with the nonconceptualist accounts developed by Evans and Peacocke. This is shown in the course of analyzing the role Kant assigns to intuition in empirical cognition. I draw attention to two claims: (i) that intuition provides for an irreducible source of a certain kind of cognitions and (ii) that it allows of objects being “given” in experience without necessarily relating these objects to the concepts derived from the understanding. As it turns out, these objects generically differ from the objects of judgments. Elaborating on what I call an Autonomy Thesis, I argue that there are two “layers” of representational content to be distinguished in experience as conceived by Kant. By interpreting Kant in nonconceptualist terms, we may better understand the kind of restrictions his transcendental idealism imposes upon cognition.