XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Indemonstrable Propositions and Analysis in Kant's "Preisschrift"

Job Zinkstok

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Beccaria
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 11 aprile 2010


In this paper I investigate Kant’s conception of indemonstrable propositions in his philosophi-cal methodology as presented in the 1764 Preisschrift by discussing their similarity with the later, critical conception of analytic judgments. By taking recourse to the traditional theory of concepts and the theory of the predicables I will show that the class of indemonstrable propo-sitions does not coincide with that of analytic judgments but that it forms a subclass of the latter, as indemonstrable propositions only predicate the immediate genus or the immediate differentia of a concept, whereas analytic judgments can also predicate analytic propria. The reason for this difference, I will argue further, lies in the fact that in contrast to analytic judgements, which always require proof, indemonstrable propositions cannot require any proof but must be immediately certain, as they are supposed to be axioms in philosophy.