XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Self-knowledge in §7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic

Ralf M. Bader

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: Conference Room
Data: 23 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010


Kant's claim that time is a subjective form of intuition was first proposed in his Inaugural Dissertation "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis" of 1770. This view was immediately criticised in reviews and letters by Schultz, Lambert and Mendelssohn. Their criticisms are based on the claim that representations change which implies that change is real. From the reality of change they then argue to the reality of time, which undermines its supposed status as a subjective form of intuition that only applies to appearances. Kant took these criticisms very seriously and attempted to reply to them in §7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. In this paper, I will provide a critical assessment of the objections raised by Schultz, Lambert and Mendelssohn as well as of Kant's diagnosis and response. In particular, I will show how Kant can consistently hold that knowledge of our mental states is restricted to knowledge of appearances.