XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Subject-Dependence and Trendelenburg’s Gap

Tobias Rosefeldt

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: Auditorium
Data: 23 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 12 aprile 2010


A famous objection against Kant’s transcendental idealism – known under the title Trendelenburg’s Gap – goes like this: In the Transcendental Aesthetics, Kant claims to have shown that spatio-temporal properties do not pertain to things in themselves but rather only to appearances. However, the argument in the Aesthetics only justifies the claim that we can never know whether spatio-temporal properties are properties of things in themselves, and hence the argument neglects the alternative that spatio-temporal properties pertain both to appearances and to things in themselves. In my paper, I will try to show that the objection can be met if Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is understood properly. On the proposed interpretation it is conceptually impossible that a property of an appearance belongs to a thing in itself.