XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Practical Action: First Critique Foundations

Adrian Margaret Smith Piper

Edificio: Facoltà di Agraria
Sala: sala Hume
Data: 25 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010


Both European and Anglo-American philosophical traditions of Kant scholarship concur in drawing a sharp distinction between Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophies. This paper is part of a larger project that takes issue with this near-universal consensus, and with the canonical interpretation of A 14/B 28 – A 15/B 29. Here I apply this reasoning specifically to Kant’s conception of practical action. I argue, first, that Kant’s use of the first-/third-person asymmetry in his analysis of action in the first Critique’s Resolution of the Third Antinomy is necessary to his account of moral motivation and moral intention in the Groundwork; and second, that the structure of pure apperception he offers in the Transcendental Deduction resolves this asymmetry.