XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant on the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof in the "Critique of Pure Reason"

Tal Glezer

Edificio: Facoltà di Agraria
Sala: sala Wolff
Data: 26 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010


I offer a novel interpretation of Kant's criticism of the ontological proof, specifically of its version in the critical period. The paper points out that any interpretation must show how Kant relies on the views he expresses in the Postulates and in the B-deduction sec. 19. In view of these constraints, the paper offers an account of Kant's view in terms of his distinctive conception of objective judgments, and its relation to the modal categories in general. Indeed, one of the advantages of this interpretation is to bring out the intimate relation between these two sections of the Analytic.
The final section of the paper discusses a second, minor argument Kant raises against the ontological proof, claiming that the key to understanding this second argument lies in correctly identifying its target as the Leibnizian, rather than the Cartesian, version of the ontological proof.